
DOCTRINE OF ERIUGENA IN RELATION TO IMMATERIALISM AND IDEALISM

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Abstract

This article considers the phenomenon of the philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena (c. 810 – c. 877) in the context of immaterialism and Hegelian absolute idealism. As a result, it was established that Eriugenian ‘idealism’ is a method of reasoned judgment about the Creator’s being that can demonstrate the proper structure of meditative thinking. On the contrary, Hegelian ‘egology’ is a type of unified methodological guide for ensuring the priority of subjectivity in the subject’s vision. This concerns a being that holds the world in its own mind. But Eriugena’s ‘idealism’ as a constructive principle of his theological reasoning is more relevant to Hegel’s idealism and German idealism in general than to Berkeley’s immaterialism.

Keywords: Eriugena, idealism, Hegel, metaphysics, theology

1. Introduction

Scientists who specialize in the study of Philosophy or Science history take high interest in medieval philosophy as the source of pantheistic ideas for modern (e.g. Spinoza) and even postmodern theoretical systems (e.g. Emerson). One of such thinkers is considered to be John Scottus Eriugena. In earlier studies on the works of Eriugena, the authors asked how Neoplatonism and pantheism could have been so improbably aligned with Christian theism in the doctrine of this genius scholar. Since Eriugena’s works were included in volume 122 of Migne’s *Patrologia* [1], popular among intellectuals, many were puzzled, wondering whether this Irishman could be considered Orthodox, and his teaching approved and traditional. Almost all 19th century research on Eriugena’s work are full of religious as well as philosophical polemics par excellence and endeavours to prove the need for academic view in Theology and to streamline the use of the methods to study ‘difficult places’. Such are the major works of Christlieb [2], Kaulich [3], Huber [4] and many other ‘pillars’ of the history of Philosophy. In these works religion and philosophy coincide. In the language of Hegel, they appeal to the notion of spirit where “consciousness

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first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind it the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the night like void of the super sensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present” [5]. From this it follows that the study of Eriugena’s philosophy was inseparable from the study of Metaphysics and the dialectic of the spirit. One work deserving special recognition is that of Brilliantov [6] as it is one of the best of its kind. However, even this work suffers from a general defect inherent to the era: he reduces Eriugena’s ‘unknown’ to ‘known’ stereotypes and special canons of research based on spirituality.

In the twentieth century, perhaps it was Nietzsche’s words that the boundaries of logic cannot act as the boundaries of things, and the situation around ‘the end of philosophy’ with the attendant numerous attempts at reconsidering earlier foundations of the ‘spiritual’ approach, that led researchers to resort to a simple, historiographical and pseudo-scientific description with critically moderate remarks and more cautious and verified conclusions of a predominantly positivist persuasion. This is seen in the works of Gardner [7], Bett [8] and a number of other authors.

The following quote by the well-known Russian philosopher, Bulgakov, is testimony that the former ‘spiritual’ issues of the nineteenth century were being presented yet again in modern studies: “The famous Irishman in his teaching, despite his sincere desire to stay within the Christian worldview, nevertheless stumbles upon Plotinian ‘emanative pantheism’ and foresees, in metaphysical terms, the future mystical system of Eckhart and Böhme. Immanentism or ‘monism’ in Eriugena is manifested, first of all, in the author’s overall concept of ‘De divisione naturae’.” [9] Bulgakov’s words clearly convey the spirit of ‘new’ (everything new is a well-forgotten old) discussions, which were also presented by authors such as Cappuyns [10], Sheldon-Williams [11], Jeauneau [12], O’Meara [13], Beierwaltes [14], Moran [15] and over 1100 others. Some more monographs were added recently: Sushkov [16] and a number of others.

2. Methods

2.1. Objectives of the study

The authors have employed comparative methods, specifically historical and typological, as well as a systematic textual analysis of research in order to understand and provide a scientific assessment of the events and facts that provoked Eriugena’s philosophical choice during the Middle Ages. The aims and objectives of the study are to show that: 1) the metaphysical foundations of Eriugena’s ‘idealism’, which is one of the prevailing characteristics that has passed from century to century, are methods of ‘reasoned judgment about the Creator’s being’ that can demonstrate the proper structure of thinking [17]; 2) the ‘egology’, *mente concipere* (keep in one’s own mind) not only of Descartes and Berkeley, but also of representatives of German idealism, is a type of unified methodological guide for ‘tracking’ and ‘capturing’ things and ensuring the

priority of subjectivity in the subject's vision. This concerns a being that holds the world in its own mind. It 'calculates everything, in everything it seeks to run ahead, that is, to conquer, outwit, and unexpectedly attack' [17, p. 201]. In other words, for the transformation and domination of nature, anticipating the 'thinking I' as a mathematical calculation in the broadest sense rests not on the old paradoxes, casus and aporias of scholasticism, but on what we learn, believe and experience in advance, deriving new orders, laws and meanings. Descartes' 'Ego cogito' draws its energy only from internal, basic principles; it is self-based, concentrating the whole world of being in itself: "In accordance with the new European priority of subjectivity, vision as an act committed by a subject turns out to be decisive" [18].

The topic of this paper presumes solving the following tasks: a consideration of the distinctions of idealism proposed here and analysis of their applicability to Eriugena's teaching; an analysis of Hegel's idealism, as well as the identification of similarities and differences between Hegel's speculative idealism and an interpretation of Eriugena's philosophy.

2.2. The difficulty of interpreting Eriugena's doctrine

Nevertheless, the difficulty of interpreting Eriugena's doctrine did not diminish. On the contrary, they grew and even 'tyrannized' fresh new interpretations, threatening to undermine their meaning and make them superficial. In most cases, new interpretations grew over the earlier ones, becoming even more incomprehensible and increasing our ignorance. The 'hard' facts (newly found manuscripts and hypotheses), peppered with the due scientific rigor of the times, actually contributed to the formation of a certain 'scientific' mythology, symptoms of increasing contradictory assessments and opinions, which forced us to believe that there are still new perspectives. In fact, the earlier approaches were just being recycled. It can probably be explained that the contemporary progress of knowledge is, on the one hand, extraordinary; and on the other hand, since the principles of the scientific method are incompatible with theological speculation, wherein the supernatural is used to explain the natural, the confusion and even chaos with the advancement of hypotheses and explanations of known facts, not to mention new ones, required more time to comprehend. And time, as always, was scarce. There was an acute need, albeit neglected, to understand the complex phenomenology of consciousness, i.e. the dialectic of reflection of things in our vision. Just as in the act of seeing we do not notice our sight, so it is with consciousness, when it is directed at an object, we are not aware of our activity. It is not impossible (photographing and copying here are not a panacea) that the presence of an external world for us is caused by the fact that the subjective is a passive and immobile mirror of the objective. In Hegelian language, in this case the investigating 'substance', the scientist's direction of thought, falls out of itself and, as a consequence, the principle of creative relation to what reality is degrades within the substance itself; the real

picture of things is eliminated and replaced by fiction – an assumption “of finitude as something negative” [19].

Thus, once the external things we contemplate (e.g. the texts of Eriugena) have turned into objects they have entered our own being. For our part, we have invested things with our meanings and assessments. At the same time, it must not be forgotten nor denied that “we call knowledge and observation of things we always and ever only know and observe ourselves, and that in all our consciousness we simply know of nothing other than ourselves and our own determinations” [20]. In stating a connection between internal state and space, we cannot even imagine this connection outside our consciousness, since if we talk about it, then we already know about it, and since this consciousness can only be thought, then again we are thinking the connection – the very connection that exists in my normal natural state, and not some other connection [20, p. 58]. In Fichte’s words, the researcher himself is this thing; he is the deepest foundation of his own being, his finitude, set before himself and thrown out of himself; and everything that he sees outside himself, is always he himself. Perhaps the way to think about it is “that the consciousness of a thing outside of us is absolutely nothing more than the product of our own presentative capacity, and that we know nothing more about the thing than, well, than we know about it, than we posit through our consciousness, that is, than we produce just by having consciousness, a consciousness determined in this way and subject to such laws” [20]. Of course, we need to guard against absolutizing the meaning of mental constructions of events and phenomena. However, if we do not understand the proper role of imaginary space, which constructs the realm of all possible connections, then we cannot avoid reiterating ideas when verifying the correctness of our constructions with Eriugena’s texts.

3. Analysis of Eriugena’s doctrine

3.1. Eriugenian doctrine in relation to immaterialism

It is known that Eriugena was one of the first to address the exceptionally complicated task of synthesizing Neoplatonism and Christian theism. In his treatise ‘On the Division of Nature’ he presented the first structuralization of natural and spiritual phenomena, which allowed the development of the natural philosophical, as opposed to spiritual, interpretation of natural phenomena and processes [21, 22]. In this article, we will try to answer one of the important questions among experts about the essence of Eriugena’s ‘idealism’.

A number of contemporary researchers think that Eriugena’s philosophical and theological ideas remain within the idealistic tradition, primarily reflecting the dominance of the scholastic method with its infinite set of ‘real’ distinctions [23-25]. Let us look at the arguments presented, and, in particular, at what is meant by ‘idealism’. Some authors understand it to mean ‘immaterialism’ in the spirit of Berkeley, concluding that this concept can be fully applied to analysing Eriugena’s doctrine [23]. But is this in fact so?

Let us assume that Eriugena spoke of the spirit as an absolute ‘immaterial reality’. Then, if we follow the arguments of the philosopher, in the future ideal order the temporal process, burdened as it is by ‘fluid’ material forms, which are alien to the Absolute and the nature of His infinite being, will certainly be abolished by Divine laws and justice. Suppose that the ‘immaterial’ can be called a true infinite being – God. From this it follows that God, because He is immaterial, always returns to Himself, having on His side the perfection of being. Nature, with its coarse material creations, would be at the mercy of movement, adapting itself to running ahead as something necessary. Because of this, it would not be able to withstand the collapse of movement and change. In the end, all the best in Nature would become possible only through the process of God creating Himself from within Himself. It is obvious that all that is untrue and material, being outside the substantial, must be subjected to negation and transformed in accordance with the divine Truth, which is Christ.

This, however, is not what Eriugena is talking about. Since the past constitutes the essence of time, it is included in the overall ethical and religious hierarchy. Since “it is more or less agreed between us that all things are from God and that God is in all things and that they were made from nowhere but from Him – since from Him and through Him and in Him all things are made <...> He Himself creates the nature of all things of which He is the Cause and Beginning <...> first when the Divine Nature is seen to be created and to create – for it is created by itself in the primordial causes, and therefore creates itself, that is, allows itself to appear in its theophanies, willing to emerge from the most hidden recesses of its nature in which it is unknown even to itself, that is, it knows itself in nothing because it is infinite and supernatural and superessential and beyond everything that can and cannot be understood; but, descending into the principles of things and, as it were, creating itself, it begins to know itself in something – ; secondly when it is seen in the lowest effects of the primordial causes, in which it is correctly said of it that it is created only, but does not create.” [26]

Any creation, because it was created by the Creator, bears the seal of perfection close to the absolute, including things created from coarse matter and subject to movement and change. They in their symbolism are something particularly soulless (they caused the fall of man – the crown of creation); yet Eriugena does not exclude them from the teleology of universal return and salvation. For example, if the time of earthly suffering and disease goes away, then, on the other hand, that still will not be its final abolition. There will not be what there was, but what remains is the subtle, speculative and unchanging fabric of our very presence, which, having achieved a healing liberation from its earthly burdens, will be transformed into a spirit, symbolically and mystically announcing itself from afar – from the very beginning of the creation of the world.

Thus, the concept of ‘immateriality’ to describe the entire unique content of Eriugena’s ‘idealism’ is clearly not enough. Berkeley-style idealism does not allow us to understand how the pure and inner Spirit of Himself made the Other

in the form of material creatures, and why they came back from this Other to the ideal spiritual state, i.e. to Himself. This miraculous and endless Divine leaving and entering Himself to contemplate the Truth itself is interspersed in the course of all things, and deserves all sympathy and deep respect from the orthodox. "From this it is most clear that our sole quest should be joy in the Truth, which is Christ; and our sole dread the deprivation of it, for that is the one and only cause of all eternal suffering. Take Christ from me, and no good is left for me, nor is there any torment left to terrify me. For I hold that the deprivation of Christ and His absence are the sole torment for every rational creature, and that there is no other." [26, p. 989A]

3.2. Eriugenian doctrine in relation to Hegel's absolute idealism

Obviously, a consideration of 'idealism' requires a broader approach. The term 'immaterial', taken from Berkeley's 'egology', represents idealism, for which all external reality disappears. As Hegel said, we know only our definitions, that is, Berkeley "talks only about the relationship of things to consciousness, from which they, according to him, do not emerge" [27]. In addition, this approach does not make it possible to properly analyse causality when, on the one hand, the intelligible substances are called essences in God by Eriugena, and, on the other hand, the same substances generate nature outside of God in time, which is easily understood in the form of categories. If we agree with Eriugena that the sensible world created by creative Thought in intelligible Man eternally resides in Thought, then such a doctrine will require discussion not only of creation and theophany, but also of the future deification of the world (the body, for example, after resurrection, having become spiritual, remains a body, but does not disappear altogether).

What, then, is the main disadvantage of Berkeley's immaterialism? To answer this question, we turn to Schelling: "The entire new European philosophy since its beginning (with Descartes) has the common defect that nature is not available for it and that it lacks a living ground" [28]. To Berkeley nature does not exist: a thing's being lies only in the fact that it is perceived by us. This, however, was never stated in Eriugena's concept of nature.

Other researchers prefer the term 'idealism', focusing on the transcendental philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and, particularly, Hegel, whose speculative idealism most correlates to the 'idealistic' content in Eriugena's doctrine [17, p. 169; 24; 25]. A feature of Eriugena's doctrine, as Moran (1999) notes, is that he was one of the first to consistently develop theological reflection on the consequences of the doctrine of God's creation of the world [24]. Creation is understood by him as a theophany, i.e. a self-creation. God gives birth to the first existing being by appealing to Himself, to His inner nature, in other words, the first act of creation is the result of Self-consciousness, Self-expression, and the demonstration of His absolute being. This paradigm of reflective self-consciousness was expressed by Eriugena in terms of the Trinity,

which also brings him closer to the Hegelian philosophy of religion [24]. Let us try to clarify this.

Divine Self-understanding is interpreted by Eriugena as the driving force behind the creation of the universe, a precondition of any created being. According to Eriugena, we will not find anything in human nature that is not spiritual and intelligible because the substance of our body is absolutely intelligible. Moreover, all physical, sensually perceived things are not self-sufficient and are derived from the incorporeal and ideal world [26, p. 887A]. If this is considered 'idealism', then the use of the term is sufficiently substantiated and significantly enriches the semantic context since it allows us to involve in the analysis the hermeneutic circle of all key concepts of ancient metaphysics, which, as far as we know, interpreted ideas such as 'vision' and 'speculation' as a 'theory' requiring genuine contemplation.

É. Gilson emphasizes this circumstance, explaining that, according to Eriugena, matter is created from folded intelligible (yet visible through the mind) properties: "To sum up, matter is twice intelligible: in itself as the receiver of its sensible qualities, and in its sensible qualities themselves, which are a confused mixture of intelligible elements" [29]. In fact, the stable and substantial origin of beings is the intelligible, invisible essence from which everything else occurs and which is the immediate result of the act of creation; and the God-created human in Eriugena boils down to a simple divine notion [29, p. 124–125].

Furthermore, in his doctrine, Eriugena attaches great significance to mental speculation. The point to what occurs and the only purpose of thought are to engage in the process of restoring human nature. The impending transformation will affect the entire cosmic and physical order. "You must be renewed in spirit!" says Saint Paul (Ephesians, 4.23–24: "you must be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and put on the new self").

The words of the apostle are extremely convincing for a person who is preparing to become spiritual and rise above everything natural. Nevertheless, Eriugena adds: together with man and in man the whole sensual world will be renewed [26, p. 1015D]. When human nature returns to the 'ideal' state (to be seen after the transformation of all sensual), following the general resurrection from the dead, earthly bodies, 'signs of life' (*motus vitalis*), and the senses lose all meaning and are completely transformed into 'the mind' (*ratio*) and, finally, into the spirit (*spiritus*, *intellectus*) [26, p. 987B]. As a result, the dying of the lower world will become a necessary condition for the resurrection and appearance of the highest ideal essence [30].

In his 'idealism' Eriugena articulately argues a kind of 'vision': the inner depth of any living being is measured only by what it makes of itself. To be yourself, you must trouble yourself to contemplate true being. The underlying meaning of 'true being' is that which is capable of returning to itself; but this implies that being has already occurred. Otherwise, why go back to what does not matter and is not necessary? In other words, being was already itself, and it

turns out to be condemned to ‘already was itself’. However, the true infinite being returning to itself is God the Spirit as Personality.

In the absolute Mind human nature is transitory, but the entire world, the world produced by ‘primordial (speculative) causes’, is within it; and by its transformation into the spirit, it will come to knowledge, knowledge to wisdom. In other words, worthy souls in their quest to reach the primary original form of being will surrender to the inner contemplation of the higher Truth, insofar as possible for created beings, and then enter into the process of deification and final union with God. They seem to disappear into God Himself, into the gloom of an inconceivable and inaccessible light, in which the causes of everything are hidden. The hidden divine secrets will be ineffably revealed to the blessed and enlightened minds, which are craving and infinitely awaiting entrance to the ideal state lost in the Fall [26, p. 1020A–1021B]. Coming into God, they will become a simple, perfect unity, and all of the natural multiplicity and infinite diversity of corporeal places and temporal orders will disappear.

This extreme realism of Eriugena, if not completely, then at least in its crucial moments and with certain allowances, is comparable to the speculative idealism of Hegel. Indeed, according to Hegel, God’s self-consciousness knows Himself in man’s knowing. He says that a thing’s appearance is our first access to it, but the real object must be internal and thus supersensible. In other words, the inner world, or supersensible beyond, has come into being and it comes from the world of appearance which has mediated it, so that appearance is the essence of the supersensible and its filling [5, p. 89]. Such an allowance assumes that in our knowledge we should, as it were, release an object from itself ‘to itself’ and lead it to an ‘appearance’, i.e. to reveal in things something that we recognize as knowing: “Nature is contained in Spirit, is created by it, and in spite of its apparently immediate being, of its apparently independent reality, it is in itself something merely posited or dependent, something created, something having an ideal existence in Spirit” [19, p. 81].

In the disappearance of the naturally sensual, something supersensible reveals itself: “When in the course of knowledge we advance from Nature to Spirit, and Nature is defined as simply a moment of Spirit, we do not reach a true multiplicity, a substantial two, the one of which would be Nature, and the other Spirit; but, on the contrary, the Idea which is the substance of Nature, having taken on the deeper form of Spirit, retains in itself that content in this infinite intensity of ideality, and is all the richer because of the determination of this ideality itself, which is in-and-for-itself, self-conscious, or Spirit” [19, p. 81]. Thus, everything that truly exists in one way or another belongs to the supersensible world and exists only in relation to it and in it. The task of the knower is not to lose oneself in the objects, but to become an object for oneself, to understand that certainty is first of all the certainty of the self and not of the sensory world. Furthermore, Hegel explains that in self-certainty “otherness is for it in the form of a being, or as a distinct moment; but there is also for consciousness the unity of itself with this difference as a second distinct moment <...> It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first

finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind it the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the night like void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present.” [5, p. 110–111]

In Hegel’s idealism, the task is to move from the finitude of consciousness to the infinity of the spirit. If due attention is not paid to this transition, there will be a premature and false picture of the limitations of Hegel’s speculative idealism, as V. Rozanov called it, this ‘Descartes abomination’ and general ‘Christian filth’ [31]. Such hasty judgments can be a fatal obstacle in the fight against the painful dead end of superficial treatment. For Hegel, a being at the stage of self-consciousness and spirit ceases to be an empty abstraction and turns into a simple fluid substance of “pure movement within oneself” [5, p. 107]. The absolute, a liberating force, precedes our cognition so that it is condemned to return to the absolute. After all, the tranquil kingdom of laws is the immediate copy of the perceived world [5, p. 96]. On the other hand, the spirit needs man in order to reveal itself as the inverted world that preserves “his essential being and brings him to honour” [5, p. 97]. It is the connection of our knowledge with the Absolute that leads to the completion of the conscious experience, resulting in absolute knowing.

4. Eriugenian doctrine and absolute idealism - what is the suitability of their linking?

In connection with the foregoing, the novelty of this study is the textual comparison of Eriugena’s doctrine and Hegel’s system and an explanation of why the medieval idealism of Eriugena is more relevant to Hegel’s absolute idealism than to Berkeley’s immaterialism. In the authors’ opinion, both Eriugena and Hegel discuss the infinite and the finite, in other words, how is a finite subject to be discovered and to come into the dimension in which the Absolute lives and acts. Knowing includes not only the known as such, i.e. a thing, an object; it also contains consciousness, that is, the relationship between ‘I’, which knows, and the object. As Hegel says, “Our ordinary Knowing has before itself only the object which it knows, but does not at the same time make an object of itself, i.e. of the Knowing. But the whole which is present in the act of knowing is not the object alone but also the ‘I’ [Ego] that knows and the relation of the Ego and the object to each other, i.e. Consciousness.” [32] Similar arguments are presented in Eriugena’s treatise ‘On the Division of Nature’ (of course, taking into account that Eriugena was not at all a Hegelian) [26, p. 490B, 603B–C, 768B; 33].

Central to Berkeley, however, was not knowledge of the absolute, but knowledge of subjectivity (gaining knowledge of the subject); but he never considered the problem that consciousness is also included in knowing a subject. According to Hegel, the task of Philosophy is to present the absolute spirit in its manifestation. The ‘ether’, in which absolute knowledge moves towards itself, must come to the outside, that is, the internal definitions of the mind’s practical abilities must become external and manifest themselves. As Hegel put it, the

external presence is removed and made to correspond with internal definitions [32]. This intentional linking of internal definitions to the reality of the outside world is also characteristic of Eriugena [26, p. 559A–B]. These, in brief, are the grounds allowing us to talk about the suitability in order to link medieval doctrine and absolute idealism.

5. Conclusions

From Eriugena it follows that Nature and God are one and the same. The whole hierarchy of things – from the invisible God to the visible things – borrows from a higher order and presupposes lower natures, and thus is both borrowing and borrowed. So, God is both the Creator and something created. From a theological point of view, it is not sustainable. From a philosophical point of view, it is also an inconsistency. Hence it may seem that if Eriugena was a Christian thinker (although influenced by late ancient philosophy), so these dilemmas would not apply to him, because Neoplatonism was likely far more subtler than this. However, the problem concerns a univocal representation of being. That is, if ‘being’ is applied to any created thing, then the God is non-being, for He transcends the being of the world. But at the same time, since the Creator is the source of all being, He is that which really and truly is. Therefore, the God has and does not have being. This is one of the main antinomies resulting from the mixing of Neoplatonic and Christian doctrines. As appears from the Eriugena’s teaching, next Ideas are (though not completely) a reflection of God’s essence; further, they are reflected in human souls and the nature of souls is realized in bodies. It turns out that creation is understood as a unified, great cycle, as an internal process that takes place in God Himself, as the manifestation of His Own life. It is only to man’s limited consciousness that God’s one-time creation of Himself is divided into a series of orders, which gradually descend from the more perfect to the less perfect. To God Himself, the creation of the world is both a free and a necessary act, an instantaneous and simultaneously eternal manifestation of the external, super-material Nature. In the future restoration of the ideal order, human nature will return to the spirit, this latter will turn into Ideas, which are then transformed into God. As the ultimate goal everything will return to uncreated and non-creating Nature, so that nothing will manifest itself except Nature. In Nature, everything will find peace and remain unified and unchanging.

According to Hegel, the appearance of a thing is our first access to it, but the real object must be internal and thus supersensible; appearance is the essence and the filling of the supersensible. In other words, in order for the supersensory to reveal itself, the naturally sensual must disappear, since as a created spirit it has a direct external being only in appearance. In the infinite tension of the spirit, thinking must rise to the consideration of speculative ideality and understand that nature lies only in mental definition. Thus, nature is the moment of the idea of God, the latter being understood as spirit. Knowing the idea of the idea leads to an understanding of God, not as nature, but as spirit in general.

Thus, despite all the commonalities of views among thinkers (e.g. true being is what has already happened and is connected with the return to oneself), they should not be exaggerated: for Hegel the ‘thinking I’ is an introspective activity, a consideration of the ‘facts of consciousness’, i.e. the activity, and not spiritual substance (as in Berkeley), and for Eriugena it is the ‘division of nature’.

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